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THE APPROVAL OF WAUKESHA’S DIVERSION 
APPLICATION UNDER THE GREAT LAKES-ST. 
LAWRENCE RIVER BASIN WATER RESOURCES 
COMPACT – BAD PRECEDENT FOR THE GREAT 
LAKES 
Adriana Forest† 
ABSTRACT: This article examines the application of Waukesha, Wisconsin in 2010 for an 
exception under the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin Water Resources Compact to 
divert water from Lake Michigan for its municipal water supply. Being the first of its kind, the 
application is of concern because it will set a precedent for future applications under the 
Compact. This article demonstrates that the approval of Waukesha’s Diversion Application is 
of serious concern and sets a dangerous precedent for the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence River. 
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I. GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
The Great Lakes and St. Lawrence River basin is a precious and finite 
natural resource for Canadians and Americans alike. The Great Lakes represent 
eighty-four percent of North America’s freshwater, and approximately twenty-
one percent of the world’s freshwater. More than thirty million people surround 
the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence River, and rely on these freshwater resources 
for drinking water – this includes about ten percent of the total population of the 
United States, and more than thirty percent of Canada’s total population.1 The 
Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Region has a combined Gross Domestic Product of 
5.2 trillion dollars across the eight U.S. Great Lakes States and two Canadian 
provinces. The Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Seaway System employs over ninety-
two thousand Canadians and Americans. 2  Thus, the Great Lakes and St. 
Lawrence River basin is of significant importance because it provides both 
economic benefits and drinking water to North Americans. As such, this natural 
resource must be protected. 
In 2005, the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin Water Resources 
Compact (“Compact”) was signed by the eight U.S. States surrounding the Great 
Lakes. A companion Agreement (“Agreement”), which includes the Canadian 
provinces surrounding the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence River, was also signed. 
The Compact and the Agreement were created with the purpose of protecting the 
finite resources of the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence River for future 
generations, and to implement a system by which this purpose can be achieved 
across the region. This includes a prohibition against new or increased diversions 
of water from the Basin. However, exceptions are allowed in very narrow 
circumstances. 
In May 2010, the City of Waukesha, Wisconsin applied for such an 
exception under the Compact to divert water from Lake Michigan for its water 
supply. Because Waukesha is in the United States, the final decision on the 
matter was made by the Compact Council, which consists of the Governors of 
the eight U.S. States surrounding the Great Lakes. Had the applicant been 
                                                 
 1 U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, GREAT LAKES FACTS AND FIGURES, (2016), 
https://www.epa.gov/greatlakes/great-lakes-facts-and-figures.  
 2 ENV’T AND CLIMATE CHANGE CAN., GREAT LAKES QUICK FACTS (2010), https://
www.ec.gc.ca/grandslacs-greatlakes/default.asp?lang=En&n=B4E65F6F-1.  
2
Canada-United States Law Journal, Vol. 41 [2017], Iss. 1, Art. 5
https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/cuslj/vol41/iss1/5
 Forest – Waukesha's Diversion 71 
 
Canadian, the final decision would have been made under the Agreement by the 
Regional Body, which consists of the same U.S. Governors and the Premiers of 
the Canadian Provinces. Waukesha’s application was approved in June 2016 by 
the Compact Council although the application did not strictly conform to the 
provisions of the Compact. Being the first of its kind, the application is of great 
concern because it will set a precedent for future applications under the Compact. 
This article will outline Waukesha’s application for a diversion of Lake 
Michigan water, and why the approval of the application should not stand. First, 
the legal status and history of interstate compacts and their uses in the United 
States will be presented. Next, an introduction to the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence 
River Basin Water Resource Compact and Agreement will be provided. Finally, 
this article will include a legal analysis to substantiate claims that Waukesha’s 
Diversion Application does not meet the specific provisions of the Compact. In 
conclusion, this article will demonstrate that the approval of Waukesha’s 
Diversion Application is of concern and sets a dangerous precedent for the Great 
Lakes and St. Lawrence River. 
II. INTERSTATE COMPACTS 
A. Introduction 
An interstate compact is an agreement between multiple States under U.S. 
law. Interstate compacts are legal instruments used for interstate cooperation on a 
wide range of topics, including water allocation, environment and conservation, 
health, crime control, education, and child welfare.3 An interstate compact is 
both a statute and a contract – it is a statute in each party’s jurisdiction,4 as well 
as a contract between the parties. 5  Interstate compacts are not merely 
administrative agreements – they constitute a valid and binding contract between 
the parties.6 As a result, they are governed by the substantive law of contracts 
and have the force of statute.7 
Interstate compacts require the elements of contract formation – offer, 
acceptance, and consideration – in order to be legally binding.8 The “offer” is the 
compact itself, and the “acceptance” occurs when the parties enact identical laws 
in their own jurisdictions.9  The “consideration” is each party’s obligation to 
                                                 
 3 NATIONAL CENTRE FOR INTERSTATE COMPACTS, INTERSTATE COMPACT CASE LAW 
(1976-2000) http://www.csg.org/knowledgecenter/docs/ncic/CaseLaw.pdf [hereinafter 
Compact Case Law]. 
 4 Frederick L. Zimmerman & Mitchell Wendell, The Law and Use of Interstate Compacts 
COUNCIL OF ST. GOV’TS, 1 (1951), http://www.csg.org/knowledgecenter/docs/ncic/Law 
AndUse.pdf. [hereinafter Law and Use of Interstate Compacts]. 
 5 Id. at 2. 
 6 General Expressways, Inc v. Iowa Reciprocity Board, 163 N.W.2d 413, 419 (Iowa. 
1968). 
 7 Law and Use of Interstate Compacts, supra note 4, at 2. 
 8 Id. at 7. 
 9 Id. at 8. 
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perform or contribute to the common enterprise. 10  Specific provisions set 
procedures for compact termination, amendment,11 and enforcement.12 Provisions 
within compacts also establish interstate compact commissions that are similar to 
other public bodies.13 These compact commissions perform functions that would 
be undertaken by ordinary departments, boards, agencies, etc. 14  in order to 
implement and carry out the provisions of the particular compact. 
Interstate compacts cannot be unilaterally amended or modified. In Nebraska 
v. Cent. Interstate Low-Level Radioactive Waste Commission, the Court stated: 
“[W]hen enacted, a compact constitutes not only law, but a contract which 
may not be amended, modified, or otherwise altered without the consent of 
all parties. It, therefore, appears settled that one party may not enact 
legislation which would impose burdens upon the compact absent the 
concurrence of the other signatories.”15 
Additionally, because interstate compacts are contractually binding between 
States, as well as binding by state law, no party to the compact can act in conflict 
with the compact’s provisions. Any state law not in accordance with a compact 
would be illegal.16 In fact, the terms of the contract supersede any state law17 
because parties to interstate compacts have agreed via contract that compact 
provisions are binding and above conflicting state laws.18 
There are three general categories of interstate compacts: border compacts, 
advisory compacts, and regulatory compacts.19 Border compacts are agreements 
between States that alter state boundaries.20 An example of this is the Virginia-
Western Virginia Boundary Compact of 1998. Advisory compacts are 
agreements that create “study commissions,” which examine interstate problems 
and report findings to member States. These do not result in administrative 
bodies or require congressional consent.21 An example is the Delmarva Peninsula 
Advisory Council Compact. Regulatory compacts, also known as administrative 
compacts, are the most widely used interstate compacts, covering topics such as 
“regional planning and development, crime control, agriculture, flood control, 
water resource management, education, mental health, juvenile delinquency, and 
                                                 
 10 Id. at 9-10. 
 11 Id. at 10-11. 
 12 Id. at 12-13. 
 13 Id. at 11. 
 14 Id. 
 15 Nebraska v. Cent. Interstate Low-Level Radioactive Waste Commission, 207 F.3d 
1021, 1026 (8th Cir. 2000). 
 16 Michael L. Buenger, Interstate Compacts (2004) at 2, Council of State Governments, 
National Center for Interstate Compacts <http://www.csg.org/knowledgecenter/docs/ncic/
Buenger-InterstateCompacts-2004.pdf> [hereinafter Interstate Compacts]. 
 17 McComb v. Wambaugh, 934 F.2d 474, 479 (3rd Cir. 1991). 
 18 Interstate Compacts, supra note 16, at 2. 
 19 Id. at 3. 
 20 Id. 
 21 Id. 
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child support.”22  Examples include the Midwest Radioactive Waste Disposal 
Compact, the Columbia River Gorge Compact, the Interstate Mining Compact, 
and the Port Authority of New York-New Jersey Compact. The Great Lakes-St. 
Lawrence River Basin Water Resources Compact also falls into this category. 
B. Interstate Compacts and the United States Constitution 
The United States Constitution provides that: “No State shall, without the 
consent of Congress… enter into agreement or compact with another State or 
with a foreign power…” This implies that the consent of Congress is required for 
all interstate compacts.23 However, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that in 
instances where Congress remains silent on the matter, only agreements affecting 
the power of the U.S. government or the “political balance” within government 
require consent. 24  Examples of compacts that would intrude on the federal 
government’s power and require congressional consent include: compacts 
settling boundary disputes, compacts settling jurisdiction over waters, and 
compacts that might negatively impact non-participating States. 
In circumstances where a compact does not impede political balance of the 
federal system, the compact will continue to operate as a contract between the 
parties. If, however, the compact does intrude on the power of the U.S. 
government and Congressional consent is not obtained, the compact will be 
rendered void.25 Interstate compacts are state law (not federal law). However, 
Congressional consent may give an interstate compact federal law status if its 
subject matter is deemed appropriate for Congressional legislation. 26  The 
granting of Congressional consent affords States regulatory power which would 
normally fall within federal jurisdiction.27 
Congressional consent may arise impliedly post-implementation based upon 
federal and state government actions, explicitly by the enactment of legislation 
that specifically consents to the compact, or preemptively if the federal 
government passes legislation that encourages States to adopt a particular 
compact. 28  When Congress consents to a compact, it is entitled to impose 
limitations on, alter, or amend the compact 29  without limitation. 30  However, 
Congress may not withdraw consent or make further changes after it has granted 
                                                 
 22 Id. 
 23 Id. at 6 (citing U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10, cl. 3.). 
 24 Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503 (1893). 
 25 Interstate Compacts, supra note 16, at 4. 
 26 Compact Case Law, supra note 3, at 10 (citing Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433 (1981) 
[hereinafter Cuyler] & Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority v. One Parcel of Land 
in Montgomery County, 706 F. 2d 1312 (4th Cir. 1983)). 
 27 Interstate Compacts, supra note 16, at 10. 
 28 Id. at 4-5. 
 29 Id. at 5 (citing Columbia River Gorge United-Protecting People & Property v. Yeutter, 
960 F.2d 110 (9th Cir. 1992) & Seattle Master Builders v. Pacific N.W. Elec. Power, 786 F.2d 
1359, 1364 (9th Cir. 1986)). 
 30 Interstate Compacts, supra note 16, at 6. 
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consent.31 In contrast to the inability of state legislatures to act in conflict with a 
compact, Congress can legislatively alter the compact in any way it chooses.32 
The Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin Water Resources Compact received 
the consent of the U.S. Congress,33 and in December 2008, the Compact became 
federal law.34 
C. Federal Law Status 
The granting of Congressional consent changes a compact’s nature 
substantially – the compact becomes the “law of the United States.” 35 
Interpretations of the compact by state courts will not set a binding precedent that 
must be followed by federal courts.36 In some instances, federal powers will be 
delegated to an interstate compact commission if there is a “clear federal and 
interstate interest” in the commission’s use of this power and the language of the 
compact suggests Congress intended to delegate this power to the commission.37 
Congressional consent also modifies court jurisdiction in relation to compact 
litigation. Although state courts maintain their jurisdiction to decide cases, 
federal courts have jurisdiction and the “final say” above state courts.38 If the 
dispute is between two states, this will invoke the U.S. Supreme Court’s original 
jurisdiction. Otherwise, both state and federal courts have concurrent 
jurisdiction.39 
D. Interstate Compact Litigation 
When interpreting compacts, the contractual nature of the arrangement 
means courts are limited by the specific terms of the compact unless those terms 
are unconstitutional.40 However, if the provisions of the compact are not specific, 
courts may institute remedies that are in line with the compact’s purpose.41 
Courts can use extrinsic evidence, such as the compact’s negotiating history, in 
order to determine the compact’s purpose and the intent of the parties.42 
                                                 
 31 Id. at 7 (citing Tobin v. United States, 306 F.2d 270, 273 (D.C. Cir. 1962) and Mineo v. 
Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, 779 F.2d 939 (3rd Cir. 1985)). 
 32 Interstate Compacts, supra note 16, at 6. 
 33 H.R. Res. 45, 110th Cong., 122 Stat. 3739 (2008) (enacted) § 1 [hereinafter Compact]. 
 34 GREAT LAKES ST. LAWRENCE RIVER BASIN WATER RESOURCES COUNCIL, 
http://www.glslcompactcouncil.org/. 
 35 Interstate Compacts, supra note 16, at 6. 
 36 Id. 
 37 Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority v. One Parcel of Land in Montgomery 
County, Md., 706 F.2d 1312 (4th Cir. 1983). 
 38 Compact Case Law, supra note 3, at 12. 
 39 International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 68, AFL-CIO v. Delaware River and 
Bay Authority, 688 A.2d 569 (N.J. 1997). 
 40 Interstate Compacts, supra note 16, at 7 (citing New York State Dairy Foods v. 
Northeast Dairy Compact Commission, 26 F. Supp. 2d 249, 260 (D. Mass. 1998)). 
 41 Id. at 8. 
 42 Id. at 9 (citing Arizona v. California, 292 U.S. 341 (1934), Green v. Bock Laundry 
Machine Co, 490 U.S. 504 (1989), Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552 (1988), and Blum v. 
Stenson, 465 U.S. 886 (1984)). 
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When litigation ensues as a result of a compact commission’s action in 
relation to an interstate compact, courts may give deference to the commission.43 
In Committee for Reasonable Regulation of Lake Tahoe v. Tahoe Regional 
Planning Agency,44 the Court held that judicial review of a commission’s actions 
is limited to the determination of whether the decision by the commission was 
“arbitrary, capricious, lacked substantial evidentiary support, or the agency failed 
to proceed in a manner required by law.”45 For example, in the U.S. Court of 
Appeals case of Old Town Trolley Tours of Washington, Inc. v. Washington 
Metropolitan Area Transit Commission,46 a bus company challenged the decision 
of the interstate compact commission to approve a permit application. The Court 
held that the Commission’s action in issuing the permit was neither arbitrary nor 
capricious, and therefore gave deference to the Commission’s decision.47 
E. History of Interstate Compacts 
The use of interstate compacts began in colonial United States, where 
compacts similar to those used today were implemented to resolve boundary 
disputes between colonies.48 In order to resolve these disputes, colonies would 
negotiate terms and submit a final resolution to the Crown. This began a tradition 
of solving interstate issues by negotiation and subsequent submission of a 
resolution to a central authority.49 This process was then incorporated into the 
Articles of Confederation, 50  and eventually, into the U.S. Constitution. The 
drafting of the language of the Compact Provision in the U.S. Constitution lies in 
the founders’ fear of unregulated interstate cooperation and powerful regional 
alliances.51 
Interstate compacts were seldom used before 1920. Between 1783 and 1920, 
a total of thirty-six compacts were signed.52 Between 1920 and 1941, another 
twenty-five interstate compacts were signed.53 Following this period until 1969, 
the use of interstate compacts grew considerably and over 100 compacts were 
enacted.54 The amount of interstate compacts that were enacted doubled between 
1950 and 1970.55 
                                                 
 43 Compact Case Law, supra note 3, at 27. 
 44 Committee for Reasonable Regulation of Lake Tahoe v. Tahoe Regional Planning 
Agency, 311 F. Supp. 2d 972 (D. Nev. 2004). 
 45 Richard L. Masters, A Review of Recent Compact Litigation, http://www.csg.org/
knowledgecenter/docs/ncic/Recent%20Compact%20Litigation.pdf. 
 46 Old Town Trolley Tours of Washington, Inc. v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit 
Commission, 129 F.3d 327 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
 47 Compact Case Law, supra note 3, at 28. 
 48 Interstate Compacts, supra note 16, at 1. 
 49 Id. 
 50 Id. 
 51 Id. 
 52 Patricia S. Florestano, Past and Present Utilization of Interstate Compacts in the United 
States, 24 J. FEDERALISM 13, 18 (1994) [hereinafter Past and Present]. 
 53 Id. 
 54 Id. 
 55 Id. 
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Between 1783 and 1969, the compact changed dramatically in type. For 
example, border compacts, which initially constituted ninety-four percent of all 
compacts, declined to twenty percent.56 Interstate compacts began to include a 
larger number of States – regional compacts rose from two percent to twenty-two 
percent of all compacts, and nationwide compacts rose from zero percent to 
thirty-three percent of all compacts.57 In comparison, in 1783, there were no 
compact commissions created within interstate compacts; the use of commissions 
only increased to forty-nine percent by the end of this period.58 The function of 
interstate compacts also changed during this time. Compacts settling boundary 
disputes declined from seventy-one percent to nine percent; compacts dealing 
with rivers decreased from twenty-three percent to sixteen percent; industrial 
compacts increased from zero percent to nine percent, and compacts dealing with 
interstate services increased from three percent to fifty-eight percent.59 
Since 1970, the rate of compact formation has declined. However, compacts 
continue to be enacted.60 In the early 2000s, U.S. States were party to an average 
of 25.4 interstate compacts. 61  There are now approximately 200 interstate 
compacts in effect.62 Many compacts have the potential to span the United States 
(i.e., are “nationwide in scope”). However, only ten percent of interstate 
compacts have a majority of U.S. States as members. 63  Recently, interstate 
compacts have been used in an effort to address national issues. The Regional 
Greenhouse Gas Initiative, which was enacted in 2008, requires States to 
implement a cap and trade arrangement to reduce CO2 emissions.64 There are 
currently a total of ten States participating in this compact.65 An example of an 
interstate compact that is national in scope and has gained membership of almost 
all U.S. States is the Wildlife Violator Compact, of which forty-four U.S. States 
are members. 
The principal effects of the Wildlife Violator Compact are twofold: (i) the 
Compact recognizes the suspension of hunting, fishing, and trapping licenses 
amongst member States, meaning that illegal activities in one State can affect a 
person’s hunting or fishing privileges in all member States; and (ii) the Compact 
implements a process through which violations of wildlife laws are handled in a 
member State as if a non-resident violator were a resident. This recognition 
increases the efficiency of enforcement officers. Less time is spent conducting 
violator processing procedures for non-residents, which without the Compact 
                                                 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. 
 61 Ann O’M. Bowman, Trends and Issues in Interstate Cooperation 35, 
http://knowledgecenter.csg.org/kc/system/files/bowman.pdf> [hereinafter Trends and Issues]. 
 62 Matthew Pincus, When Should Interstate Compacts Require Congressional Consent? 42 
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 511, 519 (2009) [hereinafter When Congressional Consent?]. 
 63 Trends and Issues, supra note 61, at 36. 
 64 When Congressional Consent?, supra note 62, at 520. 
 65 Id. 
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include: posting collateral to secure a trial date, being taken into custody if 
unable to post collateral, or being taken to court for immediate appearance.66 
These enforcement practices are required absent the Compact in order to avoid a 
violator returning to his or her home State and disregarding the terms of the 
citation.67 
Under the Compact, a non-resident violator of wildlife laws will be 
convicted in any member State as if it were his/her home State.68 Unnecessary 
inconvenience, hardship, and inefficiency are avoided under the Compact.69 In 
addition, if the violator does not comply with the terms of the citation upon 
conviction, the wildlife officer is required to report this to the licensing authority 
of the violator’s home State. 70  This requirement ensures that all convicted 
violators of wildlife laws are held liable and subject to penalties. The positive 
impact of this Compact on a regional or even national basis serves as a model for 
when a Compact secures widespread membership. Depending on the purpose of 
the Compact, national membership may not be required. In some cases, the 
membership of states within a particular region is most desirable. 
F. Good Faith in Interstate Compacts 
Because interstate compacts are contracts, they are subject to the principles 
of contract law. Signatories to interstate compacts are therefore subject to the 
duty of good faith and fair dealing. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts 
states: “[e]very contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair 
dealing in its performance and its enforcement.”71 Good faith is defined in the 
Uniform Commercial Code as: “honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction 
concerned.”72  The duty has been interpreted as “an obligation to not hinder 
performance or prevent the other party from obtaining the fruits of the bargain.”73 
The Doctrine of Good Faith also applies to state governments that are party 
to a compact, ensuring that compact provisions and obligations will be carried 
out as per the terms of the compact.74 Some interstate compacts contain good 
faith provisions. For example, the good faith provision in the Central Interstate 
                                                 
 66 Wildlife Violator Compact, art. 1, § 1(g) (entered into force 1989) [hereinafter Wildlife 
Violator Compact]. 
 67 Id. art. 1, § 1(h). 
 68 Id. art. 1, § 2(e). 
 69 Id. art. 1, § 1(j)-(k). 
 70 Id. art. 3, § (c)-(d). 
 71 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
72   U.C.C. § 5-102(7) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1977). 
 73 Marcia G. Madsen & Michelle E. Litteken, The Implied Duty of Good Faith & Fair 
Dealing in Government & Commercial Contracts, 4-5 (2014) (citing Precision Pine & Timber, 
Inc. v. United States, 596 F.3d 817 (Fed Cir. 2010), Centex Corp v. United States, 395 F.3d 
1283, 1304 (Fed Cir. 2005)), https://www.mayerbrown.com/files/Event/b18966a5-45bc-41cb-
9f1f-0110d3df2d77/Presentation/EventAttachment/a4a538c6-61f5-48b5-be71-
e041b259f951/20140512-The-Implied-Duty-of-Good-Faith.pdf. 
 74 CAROLINE N. BROUN ET AL., THE EVOLVING USE AND THE CHANGING ROLE OF 
INTERSTATE COMPACTS: A PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE 150 (2006) [hereinafter Evolving Use of 
Interstate Compacts]. 
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Low-Level Radioactive Waste Compact was relied upon in Entergy Arkansas, 
Inc v. Nebraska.75 The Compact in that case specifically stated that: “[e]ach party 
State has the right to rely on the good faith performance of each other party 
State.”76 In that case, the Compact Commission successfully argued that the State 
of Nebraska did not act in good faith when it declined to issue a license under the 
Compact. The Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin Water Resources Compact 
also contains a “Good Faith Implementation” provision, which provides: “Each 
of the Parties pledges to support implementation of all provisions of this 
Compact, and covenants that its officers and agencies shall not hinder, impair, or 
prevent any other Party carrying out any provision of this Compact.” 
G. Inter-Provincial Compacts in Canada 
In Canada, inter-provincial compacts are not implemented as widely as in 
the United States. Canada borrowed the concept of interstate compacts from the 
United States when it enacted the Canadian Driver License Compact in 1990.77 
All Canadian provinces and territories are a party to this Compact, which 
promotes compliance with traffic laws across Canada and increases highway 
safety by not allowing violators to escape penalties when they are ticketed in 
another jurisdiction.78 
At the federal level, there are also multiple agreements between the United 
States and Canada. These include the Canada-United States Free Trade 
Agreement,79 the Canada-United States Safe Third Country Agreement,80 and the 
Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement. 81  Such agreements are important to 
facilitate cross-border relationships between Canada and the United States on 
issues that are of significant importance to both countries. The Great Lakes and 
St. Lawrence River basin is a good example of a shared resource between the 
two countries that warrants protection under a regional or bi-national agreement. 
III. THE GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE RIVER BASIN WATER RESOURCES 
COMPACT AND COMPANION AGREEMENT 
A. Introduction 
The Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin Water Resources Compact is an 
interstate compact between the States of Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, 
New York, Ohio, and Wisconsin, and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. The 
                                                 
 75 Entergy Arkansas Inc. v. Nebraska, 358 F.3d 528 (8th Cir. 2004) [hereinafter Entergy]. 
 76 Id. at 11. 
 77 ERICK JEFFERY & MAX SMITH, A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO TRAFFIC TICKETS 38-39 
(2009). 
 78 Id. 
 79 Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, S.C. 1988, c 65 
(Can.) 
 80 Canada-U.S. Safe Third Country Agreement, Can.-U.S., 2002 Can. T.S. No. 2 
 81 Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement 2012, Protocol Amending the Agreement 
Between Canada and the United States of America on Great Lakes Water Quality, 1978, as 
Amended on October 16, 1983, and on November 18, 1987, U.S.-Can., Sept. 7 2012. 
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Compact was entered into on December 13, 2005. Following implementation of 
the Compact by state legislation, the Compact received Congressional consent, 
and was signed by the President of the United States on December 8, 2008. The 
Compact created the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin Water Resources 
Council (“the Compact Council”), which is the compact commission responsible 
for implementing and enforcing the Compact and consists of the Governors of 
the eight Great Lakes States (“the parties to the Compact”).82  The Compact 
Council has the authority to make final decisions regarding proposals submitted 
under the Compact.83 
Also, on December 13, 2005, the companion Great Lakes-St. Lawrence 
River Basin Sustainable Water Resources Agreement (“the Agreement”), which 
is essentially identical to the Compact, was entered into between the eight Great 
Lakes States, as well as the Provinces of Ontario and Quebec. In Ontario and 
Quebec, provincial legislation and regulations were enacted in order to 
implement the Agreement. 84  However, due to its sub-federal nature, the 
Agreement was not implemented at the federal level. Under the Agreement, an 
administering agency referred to as the Regional Body was created, which 
consisted of the Governors of the eight Great Lakes States as well as the 
Premiers of Ontario and Quebec.85 
The duties of the Regional Body under the Agreement include ensuring that 
proposals undergo a formalized Regional Review process in order to address any 
issues throughout the Basin. The Regional Body is also responsible for declaring 
whether “proposals subject to Regional Review” meet the exception criteria 
outlined within the Agreement. 86  The “Originating Party” is the signatory 
Province or State within which a proposal is made. Before the Regional Body 
and Compact Council become involved with decision-making or review of 
proposals, the Originating Party is responsible for preparing a technical review of 
the proposal and deciding whether the proposal meets the provisions of the 
Compact/Agreement. These documents are then presented to the Regional Body 
to inform their decision on the proposal. 
If the Originating Party is a Canadian Province, then the Regional Body will 
make a final decision on the proposal. If the Originating Party is a U.S. State, the 
Regional Body will give its decision in a Declaration of Finding on whether the 
proposal meets or exceeds the provisions of the Compact, or if any changes must 
                                                 
 82 Compact, supra note 33, § 2.1-2.2. 
 83 Id. § 4.7.2. 
 84 Safeguarding and Sustaining Ontario’s Water Act, S.O. 2007, c 12 (Can.); Water 
Taking, O. Reg. 225/14 (Can.); An Act to affirm the collective nature of water resources and 
provide for increased water resource protection, R.S.Q. 2009, c C-6.2 (Can.); Environment 
Quality Act, R.S.Q. 1978, c Q-2, § 31.104, 46, 124.1 (Can.); Regulation respecting the 
framework for authorization of certain projects to transfer water out of the St. Lawrence River 
Basin, R.S.Q. 2011, c Q-2, r. 5.1 (Can.). 
 85 Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin Sustainable Water Resources Agreement, Can.-
U.S., Dec. 13 2005, art. 401, ¶ 1 [hereinafter Agreement]. 
 86 Id. art. 400, ¶ 2. 
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be made to a proposal.87 The Compact Council will then render a final decision 
on the proposal. This decision cannot occur, however, until the proposal has 
undergone the Regional Review process, and the Compact Council has 
considered the Declaration of Finding and the technical review that was prepared 
in conjunction with the Review.88 Thus, the Canadian Provinces will always be 
involved with the Regional Review process of a proposal. However, as in the 
case of Waukesha’s application, the Provinces will not be involved in making the 
final decision. Instead, the Compact procedures will apply exclusively where the 
Originating Party is a U.S. State. 
The stated purposes of the Compact and Agreement include cooperation 
between the Parties to “protect, conserve, restore, improve and effectively 
manage” the waters of the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin, and the 
prevention of “significant adverse impacts of withdrawals and losses on the 
basin’s ecosystems and watersheds.” 89  All the parties to the Compact and 
Agreement recognize that the waters of the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River 
Basin are precious natural resources, connected through one hydrologic network, 
and that any future diversions from the Basin “have the potential to significantly 
impact the environment, economy and welfare of the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence 
River region.”90 Recognizing that future diversions have the potential to harm the 
Basin, the Compact and Agreement prohibit all new or increased diversions of 
Basin water. 
Under the Compact and Agreement, a “diversion” is defined as a transfer of 
water from the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin into another watershed by 
any means of transfer.91 All new or increased diversions are prohibited92 except 
for (i) proposals to transfer water to an area within a straddling community,93 (ii) 
proposals for intra-basin transfer,94  and (iii) proposals to transfer water to a 
community within a straddling county.95 Each of these is an exception to the 
prohibition against diversions, provided that certain conditions are satisfied. 
These conditions include: (a) the water is used solely for public water supply, (b) 
the proposal maximizes the amount of water returned to the source watershed, (c) 
the proposal is subject to management and regulation, (d) there is no reasonable 
alternative for water supply, (e) caution is used when determining whether the 
proposal meets these conditions, and an exception should not be authorized 
unless it can be shown that it will not endanger the integrity of the Basin 
ecosystem, (f) the proposal undergoes regional review, and (g) if the Originating 
Party is a U.S. State, the proposal is approved by the Compact Council.96 
                                                 
 87 Compact, supra note 33, § 4.5.5. 
 88 Id. § 4.5.5(e). 
 89 Id. § 1.3.2. 
 90 Id. § 1.3(a)-(b), (d). 
 91 Id. § 1. 
 92 Id. § 4.8. 
 93 Compact, supra note 33, § 4.9.1. 
 94 Id. § 4.9.2. 
 95 Id. § 4.9.3. 
 96 Id. § 4.9.3. 
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Once a diversion proposal is approved by the Council, the Parties are 
responsible for conducting a periodic assessment of cumulative impacts of the 
diversion. These assessments occur (i) every five years, (ii) each time the water 
loss from the basin reaches an average of fifty million gallons per day over any 
ninety-day period, or (iii) at the request of one or more party.97 By signing the 
agreement, each party pledges to support implementation of all provisions of the 
Compact and Agreement in good faith.98 In addition, the parties recognize that 
each provision is material to the entire agreement, and any failure to implement 
or adhere to any provision may be considered a material breach.99 
The City of Waukesha, Wisconsin submitted a proposal (“the Application”) 
to divert water from Lake Michigan under the Compact in May 2010. This 
application was submitted as an exception to the prohibition on diversions under 
the Compact – a proposal to transfer water to a community within a straddling 
county. The Waukesha Diversion Application was the first proposal for a 
“community in a straddling county” exception under the Compact. In May 2016, 
the Regional Body recommended unanimously that Waukesha’s application be 
approved. In June 2016, Waukesha’s application was approved by the Compact 
Council (see Appendix A, Waukesha Diversion Application Timeline). However, 
Waukesha’s application does not strictly meet the conditions set forth in the 
Compact and Agreement. 
B. Enforcement Provisions 
The Compact provides that if any person is aggrieved by an action taken by 
the Council under the Compact, that person is entitled to a hearing before the 
Council.100 Once this administrative remedy has been exhausted, the aggrieved 
person has the right to judicial review of the Council’s action in the U.S. District 
Courts for the District of Columbia or the District Court in which the Council 
maintains offices, provided such action is commenced within ninety days.101 A 
“person,” as defined in the Compact, is “a human being or a legal person, 
including a government or a non-governmental organization, including any 
scientific, professional, business, non-profit, public interest organization or 
association that is neither affiliated with, nor under the direction of a 
government.”102 
Considering the provisions of the Compact, as well as the importance of the 
Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin waters, Waukesha’s Application did not 
merit approval. As provided for under the enforcement provisions of the 
Compact, judicial review of the decision is an appropriate option. This review is 
necessary in order to prevent approval of similar applications in the future, 
especially in light of the precedent-setting nature of Waukesha’s application. The 
                                                 
 97 Id. § 4.15.1. 
 98 Id. § 7.1. 
 99 Compact, supra note 33, § 9.3. 
 100 Id. § 7.3.1. 
 101 Id. § 7.3.1(i). 
 102 Id. § 1. 
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next section of this article will provide background information regarding 
Waukesha’s Application, as well as arguments as to why the Application did not 
in fact meet the specific provisions of the Compact. 
IV. WAUKESHA’S DIVERSION APPLICATION 
A. Background 
The City of Waukesha, Wisconsin (“the Applicant”) submitted an 
Application for a Diversion of Water from Lake Michigan and an Exception to 
allow the Diversion (“the Application”) in May 2010. This followed a court 
order requiring the Applicant to comply with radium standards by the year 2018. 
A background of Waukesha’s radium contamination and groundwater depletion, 
and a summary of the Wisconsin Court Order, will be outlined below. 
1. Radionuclides and decreased groundwater levels in the deep aquifer. 
The deep aquifer, on which Waukesha and other communities in 
Southeastern Wisconsin rely for their drinking water supply, contains 
radionuclide concentrations that exceed federal and state drinking water 
standards. 103  Radionuclide levels in Waukesha’s drinking water supply have 
reached up to three times greater than the Radionuclide Standard of five pCi/l.104 
In order to maintain compliance, the City treats water from the deep aquifer and 
blends it with water from shallow aquifers.105 However, the City is still unable to 
consistently meet radionuclide standards. 
Wisconsin Administrative Code Chapter NR 809, promulgated by the 
Department of Natural Resources (“DNR”) under the authority granted in 
Wisconsin Statute § 281.12, establishes contaminant levels for public water 
systems (§ 809.03 and § 809.05). Community water systems were required (as 
per Wisconsin Administrative Code Chapter NR 809.50(1) and (2)) to comply 
with a maximum combined radium-226 and radium-228 level of five pCi/l by 
December 8, 2003. 106  This deadline was extended to December 8, 2006 
following a negotiated agreement between the Wisconsin Department of Natural 
Resources (“WDNR”) and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
(“USEPA”). 107  However, the City still failed to provide drinking water in 
compliance with the combined radionuclide level below five pCi/l at all times by 
the deadline.108 This is a health concern because long-term exposure to radium 
poses an increased risk of bone cancer to consumers.109 
                                                 
 103 State of Wisconsin v. City of Waukesha, Waukesha County, No. 2009-CX-4 (D. Wis. 
filed April 8, 2009) (Civil Summons). 
 104 Id. 
 105 Id. 
 106 Id. ¶ 7. 
 107 Id. ¶ 8. 
 108 Id. ¶ 19. 
 109 State of Wisconsin v. City of Waukesha, Waukesha County, No. 2009-CX-4, ¶ 20. 
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In addition to radionuclide contamination, water levels in the deep aquifer 
continue to decline. The deep aquifer is confined by the Maquoketa shale layer, 
which prevents recharging/replenishment of the aquifer.110 Due to over-pumping 
of the deep aquifer, groundwater drawdown has reached levels of 400 to 600 feet 
below ground. 111  Drawdown, as well as radium contamination in the deep 
aquifer, is of concern because Waukesha relies heavily on the aquifer for its 
water supply. As a result of radium contamination and groundwater drawdown in 
the aquifer, the City maintains that the aquifer is not sustainable and that it has 
no other water supply alternative available.112 
2. State of Wisconsin Court Stipulation and Order 
In State of Wisconsin v. City of Waukesha,113 the State of Wisconsin filed a 
civil complaint against Waukesha, seeking an injunction requiring the City to 
comply with radionuclide standards by a Court-specified date. In its decision in 
April 2009, the Court ordered that the City achieve complete compliance with 
Federal and State Radionuclide Standards by no later than June 30, 2018.114 
However, Waukesha soon discovered that it would be unable to meet this 
deadline, and applied for a diversion under the Compact in May 2010. 
B. Arguments 
On June 21, 2016, the Compact Council rendered The Final Decision In the 
Matter of the Application by the City of Waukesha, Wisconsin for a Diversion of 
Great Lakes Water from Lake Michigan and an Exception to Allow the Diversion 
(“the Final Decision”).115 Because the Application is the first proposal for a 
“community in a straddling county” exception under the Compact, the precedent-
setting nature of the Final Decision is of concern. 
In comparison to the large volume of the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence 
River, the diversion volume proposed by Waukesha seems small. However, the 
Compact requires consideration of precedent-setting consequences of a 
proposal.116 In the Final Decision, the Compact Council stated that Waukesha’s 
                                                 
 110 City of Waukesha Diversion Application, Application Summary, City of Waukesha 
Application for a Lake Michigan Diversion with Return Flow (2013), § 2.2.1, 
http://www.waukeshadiversion.org/media/1643/1_city_of_waukesha_application__summary.p
df. 
 111 Id. 
 112 Id. 
 113 State of Wisconsin v. City of Waukesha, Waukesha County, No. 2009-CX-4. 
 114 State of Wisconsin v. City of Waukesha, Waukesha County, No. 2009-CX-4 (D. Wis. 
filed April 8, 2009) (Stipulation and Order for Judgment), ¶ 13 
 115 City of Waukesha Diversion Application, Final Decision in the matter of the 
Application by the City of Waukesha, Wisconsin for a Diversion of Great Lakes Water from 
Lake Michigan and an exception to allow the Diversion (2016), http://www.
waukeshadiversion.org/media/1825/waukesha-final-decision-of-compact-council-6-21-16.pdf 
[hereinafter Final Decision]. 
 116 Compact, supra note 33, § 4.9.4(d): “[t]he Exception will be implemented so as to 
ensure that it will result in no significant individual or cumulate adverse impacts to the 
quantity or quality of the Waters and Water Dependent Natural Resources of the Basin with 
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“unique circumstances… do not necessarily apply to any other applicant or 
application.”117 However, other nearby communities experience similar problems 
with groundwater drawdown and radium contamination. 118  If the standards 
applied by the Compact Council to approve Waukesha’s application are applied 
similarly in all cases, other communities facing similar problems may also be 
awarded a share of Great Lakes water. This incremental impairment of the 
watershed is exactly what the Compact and Agreement are supposed to avoid. 
It is imperative that the Compact Council strictly interprets the provisions of 
the Compact when rendering decisions, especially those allowing exceptions to 
the prohibition against diversions. The Compact expressly indicates that the 
Compact Council is to use caution when allowing Great Lakes water 
diversions.119 Although the Compact states that an exception to the prohibition 
on diversions is appropriate “only when” the list of exception criteria are met,120 
the Compact Council approved Waukesha’s Application despite the fact that 
multiple conditions were not satisfied. 
There are four points of inconsistency between the Application and the 
Compact and Agreement. First, the approved service area contains parts of 
multiple communities which are not part of the City of Waukesha, and therefore 
the Applicant does not meet the Compact’s definition of “community within a 
straddling county.” Second, there is a reasonable water supply alternative 
available to the Applicant. Third, the proposed return flow of water to Lake 
Michigan through the Root River has negative implications for the integrity and 
health of the River ecosystem. Fourth, the Application review process did not 
provide adequate opportunity for, nor was sufficient consideration given to, 
public opinion on the Application which is a requirement of the Compact and 
Agreement. 
Because the Application does not meet requirements set forth in the 
Compact, there are ample grounds for the Compact Council to reconsider the 
Final Decision and disapprove the Application. The provisions of the Compact 
                                                                                                                   
consideration given to the potential Cumulative Impacts of any precedent-setting 
consequences associated with the Proposal”; “Cumulative Impacts” are defined by the 
Compact, § 1.2 as: “the impact on the Basin Ecosystem that results from incremental effects of 
all aspects of a Withdrawal, Diversion or Consumptive Use in addition to other past, present, 
and reasonably foreseeable future Withdrawals, Diversions and Consumptive Uses regardless 
of who undertakes the other Withdrawals, Diversions and Consumptive Uses. Cumulative 
Impacts can result from individual minor but collectively significant Withdrawals, Diversions 
and Consumptive Uses taking place over a period of time.” 
 117 Final Decision, supra note 115, § II.10a. 
 118 Great lakes and St. Lawrence cities initiative, petitioner, before the Great Lakes-St. 
Lawrence River Basin water resources compact council, “written statement in furtherance of 
request for hearing and compact council consideration” (2016) at 20, citing City of Waukesha 
Diversion Application, “Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin Water Resources Council, 
Conference of Governors and Premiers” Feb.18, 2016 Report of Proceedings at 33:8-19, 
http://www.waukeshadiversion.org/media/1727/2-18-16-public-meeting-hearing-transcript.pdf 
[hereinafter Petition]. 
 119 Compact, supra note 33, § 4.9.3(e). 
 120 Id. § 4.9.4. 
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should be interpreted and applied strictly in order to protect the integrity and 
finite resources of the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin, especially where 
an exception is being granted. However, there are multiple points where the 
Application does not meet the provisions of the Compact. 
1. The Applicant is not a “Community within a Straddling County” as defined by the 
Compact 
Pursuant to the Compact, a “Community within a Straddling County” shall 
be excepted from the prohibition against diversions provided that: “The Water 
shall be used solely for the Public Water Supply Purposes of the Community 
within a Straddling County that is without adequate supplies of potable water.”121 
A “Community within a Straddling County,” as defined in the Compact, is “any 
incorporated city, town or the equivalent thereof, that is located outside the Basin 
but wholly within a County that lies partly within the Basin.”122 
In the Final Decision, the Compact Council found that the Applicant is 
located wholly within Waukesha County, Wisconsin (which straddles the Lake 
Michigan watershed boundary) and therefore meets the definition of 
“Community within a Straddling County.”123 However, the Compact Council 
described the limits of the approved service area as including “land outside the 
City of Waukesha’s jurisdictional boundaries” 124  and “land lying within the 
perimeter boundary of the City of Waukesha that is part of unincorporated land 
in the Town of Waukesha”125 (referred to as “Town Islands”). The Compact 
Council stated in its findings that the Town Islands have been included in the 
approved service area because “for all practical purposes they are within the 
Applicant’s community boundaries.”126 
The inclusion of land outside the jurisdictional boundaries of the City of 
Waukesha amounts to a violation of the Compact. 127  The Compact clearly 
defines a “Community within a Straddling County” as “any incorporated city, 
town, or the equivalent thereof.”128 Because land outside the City of Waukesha is 
included, the approved service area includes land within multiple jurisdictions. 
The language of the Compact does not suggest that land outside an incorporated 
city, but that is “for all practical purposes” within a community’s boundaries, is 
included within the definition of “Community within a Straddling County.” 
The Compact’s definition of “Community within a Straddling County” 
should be applied strictly to avoid inappropriate diversions of Basin water in the 
future. 129  Because this is the Compact Council’s first decision regarding a 
“Community within a Straddling County,” the Compact Council’s interpretation 
                                                 
 121 Id. § 4.9.3(a). 
 122 Id. § 1.2. 
 123 Final Decision, supra note 115, § II.1. 
 124 Id. § II.5.b.i. 
 125 Id. § II.5.b.ii. 
 126 Id.  
 127 Petition, supra note 118, at 24. 
 128 Compact, supra note 33, § 1.2. 
 129 Petition, supra note 118, at 24. 
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will constitute a baseline in future decisions and there will be pressure to expand 
upon it. Thus, the Final Decision regarding the Applicant’s eligibility as a 
“Community within a Straddling County” should be reversed.130 
2. The Applicant is not without a reasonable water supply alternative 
Pursuant to the Compact, a “Community within a Straddling County” will be 
exempted from the prohibition against diversions provided that “[t]here is no 
reasonable water supply alternative within the basin in which the community is 
located, including conservation of existing water supplies.”131 Further, in order 
for an application to meet the Exception Standard, it must meet the criterion that 
“the need for all or part of the proposed Exception cannot be reasonably avoided 
through the efficient use and conservation of existing water supplies.”132 In the 
Final Decision, the Compact Council found none of the evaluated alternatives to 
be reliable sources for a sustainable public water supply and concluded that the 
Applicant was without a reasonable water supply alternative.133 
The Compact Council did not apply the appropriate definition of “reasonable 
water supply alternative,” as required by the Compact and its underlying 
principles. Additionally, the Compact Council did not consider potential 
alternatives in light of the modified service area, which substantially decreased 
the amount of water withdrawn compared with the initial application. Based 
upon the modified water service area, there is at least one water supply 
alternative available to the Applicant that does not require a diversion from Lake 
Michigan. 
i. The “No Reasonable Water Supply Alternative” Standard 
The Applicant has the onus of demonstrating that no such reasonable 
alternative is available to it in order for the Application to be approved by the 
Compact Council. “Reasonable” is defined in Black’s Law Dictionary as “[f]air, 
proper, or moderate under the circumstances, sensible.”134 Agencies often have 
difficulty defining “reasonable alternative.” The Compact does not define 
“reasonable water supply alternative,” nor does it outline any criteria for 
determining or considering reasonable alternatives. Case law suggests that an 
agency must consider all reasonable alternatives before moving forward with a 
project.135 However, at least some of the burden rests on a project’s opponents to 
forward alternatives. 136  Additionally, evaluations of reasonable alternatives 
                                                 
 130 Id. 
 131 Compact, supra note 33, § 4.9.3(d). 
 132 Id. § 4.9.4(a). 
 133 Final Decision, supra note 117, § II.4. 
 134 Reasonable, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). 
 135 LINDA A. MALONE, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 49 (2nd ed. 2007), citing NRDC v. Morton, 
458 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
 136 Malone, supra note 135, citing Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp v. NRDC, 435 
U.S. 519 (1978). 
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should be made in good faith.137 In the case at bar, opponents of the project did 
forward alternatives that were evaluated by the WDNR. However, these 
alternatives were not properly considered due to the definition of “reasonable 
water supply alternative” that was applied. 
Although the Compact does not define “no reasonable water supply 
alternative,” the State of Wisconsin adopted its own definition within its 
implementation of the Compact. It chose to define “reasonable water supply 
alternative” as “a water supply alternative that is similar in cost to, and as 
environmentally sustainable and protective of public health as the proposed new 
or increased diversion and that does not have greater adverse environmental 
impacts than the proposed new or increased diversion.”138 The Compact Council 
chose to use this definition when rendering its Final Decision139 despite the fact 
that it is inconsistent with the principles underlying the Compact and Agreement, 
and the Compact Council is not bound by Wisconsin’s definition. 
The principle that one party to a compact may not alter the compact’s 
meaning unilaterally is expressed within the Great Lakes Compact. “[A]ny 
change or amendment made to the Compact by any Party in its implementing 
legislation or by the U.S. Congress when giving its consent to this Compact is 
not considered effective unless concurred in by all Parties.”140 This principle is 
also affirmed by U.S. case law.141 In fact, Wisconsin’s enactment and subsequent 
reliance on its own self-serving definition represents a breach of good faith. 
Because interstate compacts are subject to the substantive law of contracts, 
good faith applies to all parties to the Compact. Party States are bound to carry 
out Compact provisions and obligations as set out in the specific terms of the 
agreement.142 The Compact contains a “Good Faith Implementation” provision, 
stating “[e]ach of the Parties pledges to support implementation of all provisions 
of this Compact…”143 The State of Wisconsin violated this provision and the 
doctrine of good faith when it chose to import its own definition of “reasonable 
water supply alternative.” Wisconsin’s definition is not only less stringent than 
what was intended by the drafters of the Compact, but it also contradicts the 
Compact’s purpose. 
Importing this definition and setting this standard for future applications 
under the Compact goes against the purpose and aim of the Compact. The 
Compact states that “[t]he Waters of the Basin are precious public natural 
resources shared and held in trust by the States” and that “[t]he Parties have a 
shared duty to protect, conserve, restore, improve and manage the renewable but 
finite Waters of the Basin for the use, benefit and enjoyment of all their citizens, 
                                                 
 137 Malone, supra note 135, citing Davis v. Mineta, 302 F.3d 1104, 1112 (10th Cir. 2002); 
Seacoast Anti-Pollution League v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 598 F.2d 1221, 1231 (1st 
Cir. 1979). 
 138 Wisconsin Act 2007, 227 WIS. STAT. § 281.346(1)(ps). 
 139 Final Decision, supra note 117, § II.4. 
 140 Compact, supra note 33, § 9.3. 
 141 Petition, supra note 118, at 28, citing State ex rel. Dyer v. Sims, 341 U.S. 22, 28 (1951). 
 142 Evolving Use of Interstate Compacts, supra note 74, at 150. 
 143 Compact, supra note 33, § 7.1. 
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including generations yet to come.”144 In addition, the Compact states that “[t]he 
Parties agree that the protection of the integrity of the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence 
River Basin Ecosystem shall be the overarching principle for reviewing 
Proposals subject to Regional Review…”145 
As well, because the Compact states that a proposal should be approved 
“only when” certain restrictions are met,146 it is suggested that proposals should 
only be approved in exceptional circumstances. The definition enacted by the 
State of Wisconsin does not reflect the principles expressly iterated in the 
Compact, nor is it stringent enough to meet the exception standard intended by 
the drafters of the Compact. In fact, the definition works in favor of a diversion 
as it creates a standard where alternatives are measured against a Great Lakes 
diversion.147 
Thus, the Wisconsin definition is not “fair, proper, or moderate” under the 
circumstances. By this standard, most communities experiencing difficulties with 
respect to their source of drinking water would be eligible for a diversion, even if 
there were feasible alternatives available to them. Allowing this interpretation to 
stand would open the floodgates and create a standard that is not protective of the 
Great Lakes. If the resources of the Great Lakes were infinite, it would be 
prudent to offer Great Lakes water to all communities in difficult situations. 
However, because the Great Lakes represent a freshwater resource that is finite 
and in need of protection, this luxury is not available. The Compact and 
Agreement create this protection, and the importation of Wisconsin’s definition 
would undermine the Compact’s integrity and purpose. 
ii. The Non-Diversion Alternative 
The non-diversion alternative (“the Alternative”) was proposed on behalf of 
the Compact Implementation Coalition and developed by GZA 
GeoEnvironmental Inc. and Mead and Hunt. With this Alternative, the Applicant 
would use existing deep and shallow water wells with the addition of water 
treatment infrastructure to remove radium, total dissolved solids, and gross alpha. 
This removal would include treatment by reverse osmosis (“RO”), hydrous 
manganese oxide treatment, and continued blending of water to meet water 
quality standards. In GZA GeoEnvironmental’s technical evaluation of this 
Alternative,148 it found that the Applicant would meet water quality standards 
using this Alternative. 149  Further, the WDNR found that multiple public 
                                                 
 144 Id. § 1.3.1. 
 145 Id. § 4.5.1(d). 
 146 Id. § 4.9.4. 
 147 Petition, supra note 118, at 41. 
 148 James F. Drought et al., Non-Diversion Alternative Using Existing Water Supply with 
Treatment (2015), see Appendix 1 to Canadian Environmental Law Association’s submission 
to Compact Council, http://www.cela.ca/sites/cela.ca/files/Submissions-to-Regional-Body-
Waukesha-Proposal.pdf [hereinafter Evaluation Report]. 
 149 Id. at 9. 
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comments were in favor of the Alternative.150  However, the Alternative was 
dismissed for multiple reasons. 
First, the WDNR dismissed the Alternative because the Applicant’s existing 
service area was considered in its formulation.151 As a result, the WDNR stated 
that the Alternative does not meet state laws requiring the Applicant to consider 
the delineated water service area when developing projected water demands.152 
However, the Alternative was formulated based upon the existing service area 
only because the proposed delineated service area did not meet Compact 
requirements.153 Indeed, at the time of the evaluation in July 2015, the proposed 
service area was significantly larger than the service area approved in the Final 
Decision. This difference is not a valid reason for dismissal of the Alternative. 
Because the Applicant’s delineated service area was subject to adjustment during 
the Application review process, it would be prudent and necessary to reconsider 
alternatives in light of the approved service area. Because the Alternative was not 
reconsidered in light of the approved service area, the Alternative was 
prematurely and improperly dismissed. 
Another reason for dismissing the Alternative was the sustainability of the 
deep aquifer. The Compact Council maintains that the deep aquifer is not 
sustainable.154 However, this finding is not consistent with the Evaluation Report. 
Firstly, the use of the deep sandstone aquifer was rejected based on the initial 
delineated service area, which was more than double the approved service area. 
The service area considered in the Evaluation Report was Waukesha’s existing 
service area, which is based on Waukesha’s current water supply needs and 
similar in size to the approved service area. Given the trends in aquifer levels, the 
Evaluation Report concluded that the deep sandstone aquifer is sustainable and 
can meet the Applicant’s water supply projections. 
Further to the service area considered by the Applicant, the Applicant also 
did not consider recent trends in the use of the deep sandstone aquifer. The 
Evaluation Report concluded that the City of Waukesha’s water use has declined 
since 2006.155 Despite the data which demonstrates that Waukesha’s per capita 
water use has been consistently declining since then, the Applicant used the 
average water use over a ten-year period to calculate its future demands. Thus, 
the Applicant’s forecast for water demand is not based on the most recent 
available data or consistent with declining water use trends.156 Based upon the 
current and projected future water demand forwarded in the evaluation, the deep 
sandstone aquifer is sustainable.157 
                                                 
 150 City of Waukesha Diversion Application, Preliminary Final Environmental Impact 
Statement (2016) at 7, http://www.waukeshadiversion.org/media/1641/preliminaryfinaleis.pdf 
[hereinafter WDNR EIS]. 
 151 Id. 
 152 Id. 
 153 Evaluation Report, supra note 148, see Executive Summary. 
 154 Final Decision, supra note 117, § II.3.c. 
 155 Evaluation Report, supra note 148, at 4-5. 
 156 Id. at 6. 
 157 Id. at 13. 
21
Forest: The Approval of  Waukesha's Diversion Application under the Great
Published by Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons, 2017
90 CANADA-UNITED STATES LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 41, 2017] 
 
Finally, the Compact Council rejected the Alternative because it does not 
prevent redistribution of radioactive waste that results from RO treatment.158 
However, the WDNR noted that RO treatment is used by multiple other public 
water systems in Wisconsin and other nearby States for radium treatment, some 
of which are larger than the Applicant’s.159 In addition, the WDNR has stated 
that the current quantities of radium in wastewater sludge are approved under 
Waukesha’s Wisconsin Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permit and these 
quantities will remain the same under this Alternative.160 
It is also important to note that this alternative does not require additional 
wells and therefore results in no additional adverse impacts to surface waters and 
wetlands.161 As well, the Alternative’s estimated cost is approximately half the 
cost of the approved diversion.162 Therefore, not only is the Alternative less 
harmful to the environment, but it is much more cost-effective and economically 
prudent. Therefore, a viable, economically- and environmentally-sound 
alternative that is fair, proper, moderate, and sensible under the circumstances is 
available to the Applicant. Because this reasonable alternative was disregarded, 
this amounts to a violation of the Compact. 
3. The diversion will cause adverse environmental impacts to the Root River 
Pursuant to the Compact, a “Community within a Straddling County” 
exception should not be authorized by the Compact Council “unless it can be 
shown that it will not endanger the integrity of the Basin Ecosystem.”163 Further, 
the following criterion is included in the Exception Standard: “The Exception 
will be implemented so as to ensure that it will result in no significant individual 
or cumulative adverse impacts to the quantity or quality of the Waters and Water 
Dependent Natural Resources of the Basin.” 164  “Water Dependent Natural 
Resources” are defined in the Compact as “the interacting components of land, 
water, and living organisms affected by the Waters of the Basin.”165 
In the Final Decision, the Compact Council found that while there may be 
some negative impact on aquatic life within the Root River, the return flow to 
Lake Michigan will provide “an overall net benefit” to the Root River by 
stabilizing river flows during low-flow periods and improving conditions for 
salmonids during spawning.166 As a result, the Compact Council found that the 
Exception Standard was satisfied. 167  However, the WDNR’s Environmental 
Impact Statement does not suggest that the Root River will remain unimpaired 
by the return flow. 
                                                 
 158 Final Decision, supra note 117, § II.4(b). 
 159 WDNR EIS, supra note 150, at 109. 
 160 Id.  
 161 Evaluation Report, supra note 148, at 14. 
 162 Id. 
 163 Compact, supra note 33, § 4.9.3(e). 
 164 Id. § 4.9.4(d). 
 165 Id. § 1.2. 
 166 Final Decision, supra note 117, § II.7(b). 
 167 Id. § II.8(e). 
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Firstly, effluent from the Waukesha Wastewater Treatment Plant (“WWTP”) 
will contribute to phosphorus loading in the Root River. As a result, increased 
plant growth will occur in Racine Harbor over time, which may necessitate 
aquatic plant management, including herbicide treatments. 168  Increased 
phosphorus loading to the Root River could also increase the range of daily 
fluctuations in dissolved oxygen levels.169 Daily periods of very low dissolved 
oxygen levels will have a negative impact on aquatic life within the River. 
In addition, increased concentrations of chlorides from WWTP effluent may 
present a risk to fish and aquatic invertebrates within the Root River estuary.170 
The current WWTP chloride effluent concentrations are higher than the proposed 
water quality based effluent limits (“WQBEL”) for the River.171 Although the 
Applicant drafted a compliance plan demonstrating how chloride WQBEL could 
be met,172 chloride levels are already elevated in the Root River.173 The addition 
of chloride in WWTP effluent will increase the risk of toxicity to the aquatic life 
and biota in the Root River ecosystem.174 
Furthermore, pharmaceuticals and endocrine disruptors will enter the Root 
River in WWTP effluent. 175  Previous studies surrounding the impacts of 
wastewater treatment plant effluent on ecosystems have observed pharmaceutical 
levels likely to harm entire populations of aquatic organisms.176 Exposure to 
pharmaceuticals will have negative impacts on resident fish and aquatic 
macroinvertebrates within the Root River estuary.177 The WDNR does not have 
regulatory authority to enforce monitoring of pharmaceuticals or to impose limits 
in wastewater effluent.178 As a result, pharmaceutical levels in WWTP effluent 
that is discharged to the Root River will remain unregulated.179 
In addition to the WDNR’s Environmental Impact Statement, a fairly recent 
study of the Root River Watershed points to potential adverse environmental 
impacts arising from return flow effluent. 180  The Applicant asserts that the 
addition of effluent will have no effect on pollutant concentrations in the River 
and that the addition of effluent will have a “dilutional” effect, thereby 
decreasing contaminant concentrations.181 However, the addition of water will 
                                                 
 168 WDNR EIS, supra note 150, at 182. 
 169 Id. at 184. 
 170 Id. at 182. 
 171 Id. at 185. 
 172 Id. at 182. 
 173 Id. at 186. 
 174 Petition, supra note 118, at 52. 
 175 WDNR EIS, supra note 150, at 182. 
 176 Id. 
 177 Id. 
 178 Id. 
 179 Petition, supra note 118, at 53. 
 180 Adrian Koski et al., Baseline Assessment of water quality in support of the Root River 
Watershed Restoration Plan (2013), http://www.sewrpc.org/SEWRPCFiles/Environment/ 
RootRiverWshedRestorationPlan/RR_DataAnalysisReport_March2014.pdf [hereinafter Root 
River Report]. 
 181 WDRN EIS, supra note 150, at 184. 
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not remove pollutants from the River. The pollutants that are already present in 
the River will remain and the pollutants within the effluent will only add to the 
amount of contaminants present. 
As well, the increased flow that will result from the addition of WWTP 
effluent may increase the release of pollutants that are bound on sediments in the 
River. Sediment is transported down the River and settles where it meets an 
obstruction or low flow. In low flow areas within the River, pollutants are bound 
to sediment and the continual flow that will result from WWTP could result in 
re-suspension of these sediments, further increasing the amount of pollutants in 
the River.182 A sediment transport model has not been completed for the River, 
so it is unclear what the effect of this increased flow will be. It is clear, however, 
that increased flow will result. The Waukesha Wastewater Treatment Plant 
would be the largest discharger to the River. There are three other wastewater 
treatment plants discharging into the watershed currently but these service very 
small communities. 
Aside from sediment re-suspension, increased flow may also impact habitat 
characteristics within the River. In some areas of the River which currently 
experience very low flow, the addition of effluent will cause an increase in flow 
as well as movement of water. While increased flow in these areas may be 
beneficial in some respects, such as fish migration, it may be detrimental in 
others. For example, it may limit the types of fish and macroinvertebrates that are 
able to survive in the River. 183  The change in temperature and amount of 
sediment (turbidity) that will result from the increased effluent may only allow 
tolerant species to survive, therefore altering the species composition of the 
River.184 
Finally, the fact that a baseline assessment of the River has not taken place 
and there is no robust monitoring plan in place is of concern. Without such a 
baseline assessment, it will not be possible to compare future conditions in the 
River to the River’s condition prior to the diversion. Therefore, it will be 
impossible to say with any degree of certainty what the impact of the return flow 
actually is. In addition, without a robust monitoring plan in place, it will be 
difficult to tell whether the return flow is having adverse environmental impacts 
on the integrity and ecology of the River. 
The Compact Council has found that the return flow to Lake Michigan will 
positively impact salmonid spawning events to the Root River Steelhead 
facility185 and that the effluent from the WWTP will result in a “net benefit” to 
the Root River. However, this positive impact is only true during low-flow 
periods in the Root River.186 In addition, it is difficult to see how this potential 
benefit results in a “net benefit” to the Root River. Even if a “net benefit” to the 
                                                 
 182 Root River Report, supra note 180, at 1-5, 1-11. 
 183 Id. at 1-1. 
 184 James R. Karr, Assessment of Biotic Integrity Using Fish Communities, 6 FISHERIES 
21, at 23 (1981). 
 185 Final Decision, supra note 117, § II.7(b). 
 186 WDNR EIS, supra note 150, at 190. 
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Root River is provided, this does not preclude the existence of significant 
adverse environmental impacts on the Root River. The return flow through the 
Root River will endanger the integrity of the Basin ecosystem and may present 
significant adverse impacts to the Water Dependent Natural Resources of the 
Root River. Therefore, the lack of a plan represents a violation of the Compact. 
4. The Compact’s public participation requirements were not satisfied 
The Compact provides that Parties to the Compact recognize the importance 
and necessity of public participation in promoting management of the water 
resources in the Basin.187 The Compact states that “it is the intent of the Council 
to conduct public participation processes concurrently and jointly with processes 
undertaken by the Parties and through Regional Review.” 188  However, the 
Regional Body review process was inadequate as it provided for only one public 
meeting held in the City of Waukesha while there was intense interest in the 
matter across the entire Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Basin in the United States 
and Canada. People in the vicinity of Waukesha can hardly be considered 
representative of those throughout the Basin. In addition, pursuant to the 
Compact, the Regional Body is required to consider comments received through 
public participation before issuing a Declaration of Finding.189 It does not appear 
the Regional Body gave any consideration to the hundreds of public comments 
against the Application. 
The Compact also provides that procedures for review of applications are 
subject to the requirement that they “assure public accessibility to all documents 
relevant to an Application, including public comment received.”190 This public 
participation requirement was not met because the conditions for approval were 
not open to public comment while they were being debated by the Regional 
Body and Compact Council. Conditions for approval were relevant to the 
Application and the public was given no opportunity to comment on these 
conditions prior to the Final Decision. 
The public comment period closed on March 14, 2016, after which the 
Compact Council significantly changed the proposed diversion area and 
modified the volume of water that would be withdrawn in the diversion. Despite 
these substantial changes to the application, no public comment on the conditions 
in the Final Decision were allowed as required by the Compact. All documents 
relevant to an Application are to be accessible to the public. 
The only way in which the public participation provisions of the Compact 
could be fulfilled would be if these supplementary technical analyses were 
carried out, made available to the public, and public feedback was allowed and 
considered prior to a final decision on the matter. The inadequacy of the public 
participation process throughout the application process amounts to a violation of 
the Compact. 
                                                 
 187 Compact, supra note 33, § 6.1. 
 188 Id. § 6.2. 
 189 Id. § 4.5.3(d). 
 190 Id. § 6.2.2. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the Compact Council should reconsider the Waukesha 
Diversion Application. In order to protect the integrity of the Great Lakes-St. 
Lawrence River Basin Water Resources Compact and Agreement, the decision to 
approve the Application should be overturned. Although the Final Decision was 
rendered by the Compact Council because the Originating Party in this case was 
a U.S. State, any future proposals that originate in either Canada or the United 
States will be decided based upon the precedent set by this decision. 
In order to merit approval under the Compact and set the appropriate 
standard for future applications under the Compact and Agreement, the 
Application must be amended or the decision to approve the application 
overturned. An appropriate approval of the Application can only be achieved 
following: (i) revision of Waukesha’s water service area so that it complies 
strictly with the Compact’s definition of “community within a straddling 
county”; (ii) application of an appropriate definition of “reasonable water supply 
alternative” that is protective of the Great Lakes and reconsideration of water 
supply alternatives in light of the revised service area; (iii) environmental 
baseline assessments of the Root River to determine the conditions of the River 
and a more comprehensive monitoring program to ensure protection of the River. 
In the alternative, reconsideration of other options for return flow that are more 
protective of the watershed and that do not cause adverse environmental impacts; 
and (iv) a process which is respectful and adheres to the public participation 
requirements set out in the Compact and Agreement, including allowance for 
public comment on revised Application materials, especially those which 
fundamentally change the nature of the Application. 
The Great Lakes and St. Lawrence River basin is of great importance to 
Americans and Canadians alike. In order to protect this natural resource, the 
Compact and Agreement must be strictly adhered to. This is especially true in 
light of North America’s growing population and the increasingly complex 
environmental issues that persist in the Great Lakes region as well as around the 
world. The water resources provided by the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence River 
are finite and sustaining this resource for future generations is of utmost 
importance. Setting a “loose” precedent puts the basin in danger of increased 
withdrawals in the future. This may impede the ability of future generations to 
access the benefits drawn from the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence River on which 
millions of North Americans depend. 
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APPENDIX A 
Waukesha’s Diversion Application Timeline 
 
May 2010 Waukesha submits Application for diversion to WDNR. 
 
July 2011 WDNR holds public informational meeting/hearing to 
introduce the review process and receive comments on 
the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) and 
interpretation of review criteria. 
 
October 2013 WDNR receives revised Application (version posted on 
web) from Applicant (vol. 1 Application Summary, vol. 
2 Water Supply Service Area Plan, vol. 3 Water 
Conservation Plan, vol. 4 Return Flow Plan, vol. 5 
Environmental Report). 
 
Fall 2013 Applicant holds informational meetings in Oak Creek, 
Racine, Milwaukee, and Waukesha; WDNR accepts 
comments on revised Application, and receives 
supplemental Application information from Applicant. 
 
WDNR reviews Application and public comments; 
WDNR prepares draft Technical Review and draft EIS; 
WDNR makes preliminary decision on whether 
Application is approvable. 
 
August 2015 WDNR reviews public comments & incorporates them 
into Technical Review and EIS; WDNR determines that 
Application meets Compact criteria. 
 
January 7, 2016 WDNR forwards Application and supplemental 
materials (including memos) to Regional Body and 
Compact Council in addition to Preliminary Final EIS, 
Technical Review, and Originating Party’s Draft 
Declaration of Findings; Regional Body Review Process 
begins. 
 
January 12, 2016 Public Comment period begins. 
 
February 18, 2016 Regional Body and Compact Council hold informational 
hearing in Waukesha. 
 
March 14, 2016 
 
Public Comment period ends. 
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March 22, 2016 Michigan submits Technical Review to Compact 
Council (coincides with deadline for submission of 
Technical Reviews). 
 
April 7, 2016 Final draft of Originating Party’s Declaration of 
Findings is posted; Regional Body face-to-face meetings 
and webinars (open to public) to consider draft 
Declaration of Findings are carried out from April 21 to 
May 18. 
 
May 18, 2016 Regional Body submits final Declaration of Findings to 
Compact Council following proposed amendments by 
Wisconsin, Minnesota, and Michigan to draft 
Declaration of Findings. 
 
June 8, 2016 Preliminary discussion on draft Compact Council Final 
Decision (including Conditions) begins (not open to 
public). 
 
June 21, 2016 Compact Council holds face-to-face meeting to make 
decision on Application (open to public); Compact 
Council issues Final Decision approving Application 
with Conditions following proposed amendments to 
draft Final Decision by Wisconsin, Minnesota, and 
Michigan. 
 
Next Waukesha will submit application for required permits 
to WDNR; WDNR will conduct permit reviews and 
issue decisions on permits; WDNR will issue a final 
decision on the Application; opportunities for dispute 
resolution in WI. 
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